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ABSTRACT
Two categories of alienage-jurisdiction cases have proven
troublesome: cases involving permanent-resident aliens and cases
involving international corporations. Jurisdiction in these categories
depends upon the construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1332’s deeming provisions.
The permanent-resident deeming provision and the corporate deeming
provision operate uncontroversially to remove certain cases from federal
jurisdiction, but controversy exists as to what extent they create
jurisdiction that did not exist before the amendments that added the
deeming provisions. The results and analytical approaches in these
categories have varied, and the resulting confusion is unsatisfactory. The
cases in this area are plagued by a structural flaw—while framing their
analyses in terms of “clear” or “unambiguous” text, the courts have
actually imposed no construction at all, instead jumping extra-textually
to the what-would-Congress-have-wanted question. Further, courts faced
with cases in each category have decided the cases without reference to
the other category.
My solution is a modest one but provides the consistency needed in
a jurisdictional inquiry. I give the words “shall be deemed” a consistent
construction in the two deeming provisions and resolve the missing-word
problem that lurks in the background. Under my solution, the words
“shall be deemed” perform a simple function in the deeming
provisions—they confer State citizenship on certain litigants. But they do
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not strip a party of preexisting alien status. When construed this way and
combined with the § 1332(a) jurisdiction-granting subcategories, the
deeming provisions create no jurisdiction that did not exist before the
deeming provisions.
My solution provides several benefits. First, it provides the
consistency and coherence needed in a jurisdictional inquiry. Second, it
is textually faithful and gives effect to similar language used in the
deeming provisions and differing language used elsewhere in § 1332.
Third, it avoids the constitutional problems that arise under alternative
construction. To be sure, one might conjure up scenarios where, in the
view of the conjurer, exercising jurisdiction would better serve the
purposes of alienage jurisdiction. But those scenarios are rare, and
desirability of results cannot distort the task—giving effect to the statute.
Among permissible solutions, mine yields the best results. It simply is
not accepted as an acceptable method of statutory interpretation that
when no construction yields the construer’s desired result in every case,
the statute need be given no construction except what Congress should
have intended in each case.
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INTRODUCTION
Two categories of alienage-jurisdiction cases under 28 U.S.C. §
1332 have proven troublesome. The first category involves permanentresident aliens, the second involves international corporations.1 Within
each category, the courts’ analytical approaches and results have varied
widely. The current state of the law is unsatisfactory, with jurisdiction
too often depending upon unpredictable guesses at congressional intent
without providing a coherent construction of § 1332 to guide future
litigants. While courts have decided the cases in each of the two
categories without reference to the other, in this Article I propose a
solution that synthesizes the two categories and gives the language “shall
be deemed”2 in § 1332 a consistent construction. In one sense, the
solution that I propose is modest, in that it produces results consistent
with the majority approach under each category. But in another sense it
is novel because it is textually reconcilable, it synthesizes both
categories, and it provides the certainty needed in a jurisdictional inquiry.
A preliminary note about my solution is needed. It is not one of a
strict constructionist, whatever that means. But it is one of a
constructionist. The cases in this area are plagued by a structural flaw.
While framing their analyses in terms of “clear” or “ambiguous” text, the
courts have actually imposed no construction at all, instead jumping to
the what-did-Congress intend answer, which when divorced from the text
translates into what the judge thinks Congress should have done.3 But
even spotting an ambiguity is not a license to choose the most desirable
result. Rather, spotting an ambiguity is only a license to choose between
permissible constructions of the words. The end goal should be to give
1

In this article, I use the term “international corporations” to refer to a corporation
that has either—but not both—a foreign incorporation or a foreign principal place of
business. No problem exists if the corporation is purely foreign or purely domestic. See
infra pp. 84-85.
2
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
3
“When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on
the basis of what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection between
the two, your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask yourself what a
wise and intelligent person should have meant and that will surely bring you to the
conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 18 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1997).
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the statute a meaning that resolves the instant case and applies
consistently in future cases, not to merely choose the winner in each
case. Consistency and predictability are especially important in
jurisdictional inquiries, where the lack of either results in prolonged
litigation about where to litigate.
To determine jurisdiction in cases involving international
corporations and permanent-resident aliens, courts must construe two
“deeming provisions” in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which I will refer to
individually as the “corporate deeming provision”4 and the “permanentresident deeming provision,”5 respectively. As explained in Part I.B,
determining jurisdiction under § 1332 is a two-step process: a court must
first classify the citizenship of the parties and second determine whether
the party lineup as classified satisfies any of the jurisdiction-granting
subcategories of § 1332(a). The deeming provisions impact the first
step—classifying citizenship.
The corporate deeming provision and the permanent-resident
deeming provision use the same “deeming” language, which is
emphasized below. The corporate deeming provision provides that a
“corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of
business.”6 The permanent-resident deeming provision provides that “an
alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be
deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.”7 The
“shall be deemed” phrase becomes important later, both in anchoring a
cohesive, textually defensible, synthesized result, and in demonstrating
how the courts have been skipping a step.
Both deeming provisions were added by congressional amendments
and unquestionably remove from federal jurisdiction some cases that
were within it before the amendments. The disputes in this area have
centered on whether, while removing some cases from §1332, the
deeming provisions also create jurisdiction in some cases where
jurisdiction did not exist before the amendments added the deeming
provisions. What becomes apparent later is that resolving the does-itexpand-jurisdiction question requires us to insert a word into the
deeming provisions. My solution resolves the missing-word problem
consistently in both provisions. At the risk of providing too much
information too soon and before the needed context, the next paragraph
previews the missing-word problem and my solution.
4
5
6
7

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).
Id. § 1332(a).
Id. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1332(a) (emphasis added).
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Under my solution, the words “shall be deemed” perform a simple
function in the deeming provisions. They confer State citizenship (that is
capital-S State, meaning a United States State)8 on litigants. But they do
not strip litigants of pre-existing alien status. If an alien was an alien
before the deeming provision was passed, she retains her alien status. So,
the deeming provisions deem a litigant also a State citizen, rather than
only a State citizen. When construed this way, neither of the deeming
provisions create jurisdiction where it did not exist before the
amendments. The historical context suggests that Congress enacted the
deeming provision to remove essentially local disputes from § 1332.
Under my approach, that is all the provisions do. Two other benefits
follow. First, my solution avoids the constitutional problems created by
construing the deeming provisions to strip a litigant of alien status. And
second, my solution gives effect to differing language in the other
deeming provision in § 1332, which expressly provides that certain
litigants are deemed “only” citizens of certain States.
To be sure, one might conjure up certain scenarios where my
solution would eliminate jurisdiction but where, in the view of the
conjurer, exercising jurisdiction would better serve the purposes of
alienage jurisdiction. But it is not an acceptable method of statutory
construction to conclude: when no construction yields the construer’s
desired result in every case, the statute need be given no construction.
The Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I will outline the
structure of subject-matter jurisdiction generally and the statutory grant
of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 specifically.9 This preliminary
material, while elementary in a traditional diversity case, presents
subtleties that must be mastered to understand the problems that have
arisen in the two categories. In Part II, I will outline the issues
surrounding both deeming provisions and how courts have resolved
recurring litigation patterns.10 In Part III, I will propose my solution and
demonstrate how it operates consistently in both categories, how it solves
the problems raised in Part II, and how it applies in common scenarios.11
Finally, at the end of the Article, two charts appear.12 The charts contain:
(1) the common scenarios presented under both deeming provisions; (2)
whether jurisdiction existed in each scenario before the relevant deeming
provision; (3) whether jurisdiction exists under my solution; and (4)
8

The reference to capital-S States also includes United States Territories, the
District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(e).
9
See infra Part I.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part II.
12
See infra Appendix.
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whether jurisdiction might exist under any feasible alternative solutions.
While I aim this Article at the current interpretative task facing the
courts, in the margins I will also reference and compare proposed
legislation, which is in its early stages.13
I. BASIC STRUCTURE OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION AND § 1332
The cases involving international corporations and permanentresident aliens present questions both of statutory construction and
constitutional boundaries. These questions often overlap, as the potential
unconstitutional results influence statutory construction. This Part
provides the structural background necessary to understand the issues
addressed in Part II. In Part I.A, I will outline the basic nature of the
subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry and the role of Article III of the
United States Constitution in that inquiry. In Part I.B, I will detail the
structure of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, emphasizing alienage jurisdiction.
A. Article III’s Role in the Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Inquiry
Article III, § 2 provides that the judicial power “shall extend” to
certain categories of cases or controversies, known as the heads of
jurisdiction.14 Despite the “shall extend” language, Article III is not a
self-executing grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal courts.15 That is,
Article III confers no jurisdiction on the federal district courts.16 To have
subject-matter jurisdiction, the federal district courts need congressional

13
See H.R. 5440, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006). H.R. 5440, entitled “A B[ill] to
amend title 28, United States Code, to clarify the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, and
for other purposes,” was approved by the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee on May 22, 2006. Id.
14
“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority; —to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party—to Controversies between two or more
States;—between a State and Citizens of another State [modified by the 11th
Amendment];—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
15
Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986); Cary v. Curtis, 44
U.S. 236, 245 (1845).
16
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807; Cary, 44 U.S. at 245; John T. Parry, No Appeal:
The U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty’s Effort to Create Federal Jurisdiction,
25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 543, 561; Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional
Limitations on Congress’s Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 23-24 (1981). In contrast, Article III’s grants of jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court are self-executing.
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authorization.17 What purpose, then, do the heads of jurisdiction serve in
Article III, § 2? The heads of jurisdiction define the limits on Congress’s
power to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts.18 In other words,
Article III, § 2 defines the maximum reach of the federal judicial
power—it sets the limits on what jurisdiction Congress can give its
courts.19 When Congress confers jurisdiction on the federal courts, it
must be able to point to one of the heads of jurisdiction within the
Constitution as authorizing that particular grant. Thus, determining
subject-matter jurisdiction is a two-step process. First, did Congress
confer jurisdiction? And second, if so, did Article III, § 2 give Congress
the power to do so?
In most modern litigation, the focus is on the first step—
determining whether Congress conferred jurisdiction. This focus is
appropriate because, in most cases, jurisdiction depends upon statutes
that the Supreme Court has construed more narrowly than the boundaries
of Article III. For example, in federal-question cases, the focus is almost
always on the scope of the statutory grant, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because the
court has construed § 1331’s jurisdictional grant much more narrowly
than the corresponding head of jurisdiction.20 Similarly, in a pure
diversity case (one involving no alien parties), courts have no need to
check constitutional boundaries because, as detailed in the next part, the
Court has construed the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction more
narrowly than the corresponding head of jurisdiction that authorizes

17

Cary, 44 U.S. at 245 (“[T]he judicial power of the United States, although it has its
origin in the Constitution, is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to
this court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the modes of its
exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the
tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court), for the exercise of the judicial power, and of
investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent or exclusive, and of
withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress
may seem proper for the public good.”). Id.
18
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (“The Constitution has defined the limits
of the judicial power of the United States, but has not prescribed how much of it shall be
exercised by the [lower federal courts] . . . .”); see Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136
(1989); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983).
19
Rory Ryan, No Welcome Mat, No Problem?: Federal-Question Jurisdiction After
Grable, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 621 (2006).
20
For example, the well-pleaded-complaint rule eliminates some cases from district
court jurisdiction under § 1331. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908). Although the presence of a federal defense makes a case “arise under” federal
law for Article III purposes, Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467
(1911), Congress can override the rule. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136-137
(1989) (The federal officer removal statute “merely serves to overcome the well-pleaded
complaint rule which would otherwise preclude removal even if a federal defense were
alleged.”).
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Congress to confer jurisdiction in cases “between Citizens of different
States.”21
Alienage cases (particularly those involving permanent-resident
aliens) can raise issues at both steps. Cases involving international
corporations and permanent-resident aliens present difficult questions of
§ 1332’s proper construction. But unlike the plain vanilla federalquestion and diversity cases mentioned last paragraph, the alienage cases
also present constitutional questions. Article III authorizes Congress to
confer jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different States and in
cases between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state (aliens).22 But Article III does not authorize Congress to confer
jurisdiction in cases solely between aliens.23 Certain expansive
constructions of the deeming provisions raise questions about the precise
boundaries of Congress’s Article III power and about exactly what
constitutes a forbidden suit between aliens.24 Because of the potential
constitutional problems, the two steps commingle—under accepted
principles of statutory construction, the potential unconstitutionality
influences the construction of the statutory language.
Having presented the basic constitutional structure, I will leave the
details of the constitutional questions until Parts II and III. Next, I turn to
the statutory grant of diversity and alienage jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §
1332.
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and the Deeming Provisions
28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides, in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction over all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or

21

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (the completediversity rule arises from the language of § 1332, not from the Constitution. “Article III
poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity,
so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.”).
22
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23
Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, (1809); see also Kramer v.
Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 825 n.2 (1969) (federal court may not exercise
jurisdiction over case solely between two alien corporations); Jackson v. Twentyman, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 136, 136 (1829) (noting that, under the Constitution, “the judicial power was
not extended to private suits, in which an alien is a party, unless a citizen be the adverse
party.”); Montalet v. Murray, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 46, 47 (1807) (“The Court was
unanimously of opinion that the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction of cases
between aliens.”).
24
See generally In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (S.D.
Ind. 2003) (noting the potential collision course between certain constructions of the
permanent-resident deeming provision and Article III).
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value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is
between—
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
and
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of
a foreign state are additional parties. . . .
For the purposes of this section . . . and section 1441 an alien
admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be
deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.
...
(c) For purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title—
(1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by
which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business . . .
(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be
deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent,
and the legal representative of an infant or incompetent shall be
deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or
incompetent.25

Assuming the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied,
jurisdictional inquiries under § 1332 have two steps. First, the court must
classify the citizenship of all the parties. Section 1332 contains several
provisions governing how to classify a party’s citizenship.26 But not all
citizenship questions are answered by § 1332, and the citizenship
classification therefore often requires resort to judicially created
principles.27 Second, having classified the parties’ citizenships, the court
must examine whether the party lineup fits one of the subsections of §
25

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)-(c) (2006).
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (c)-(d) (2006).
For example, the definition of an individual’s citizenship has been left to judicial
development. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3611 (1984) [Hereinafter
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE] defines what constitutes a corporation’s principal
place of business; see also Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873 (5th Cir.
2004).
26
27
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1332(a). The subsections of § 1332(a) are the congressional grants of
jurisdiction. For logistical reasons, I will discuss the steps in reverse
order, starting with the subsections.
(1) The Subsections
Subsections (a)(1)-(a)(3) of § 133228 grant jurisdiction in three
different categories of cases and contain subtleties that are lost in a
common generalization regarding § 1332. It is often generalized
(imprecisely) that § 1332 requires “complete diversity” of citizenship
and that all aliens are treated as citizens of the same foreign state.29 So
(following the generalization) if the case involves litigants on both sides
who either share citizenship in a State or who are both aliens, jurisdiction
is improper. This generalization will, in some situations, produce
incorrect results, as demonstrated below. A proper analysis views each
subsection as an independent grant of jurisdiction.30
Subsection (a)(1) is the grant of pure diversity jurisdiction.31 It
grants jurisdiction in cases between “citizens of different States.”32 The
Court has consistently construed this quoted statutory phrase to require
complete diversity of citizenship, meaning that no litigant on one side of
a case can share State citizenship with any litigant on the other side of
the case.33 Co-parties, but not adverse parties, can share State citizenship.
Importantly, subsection (a)(1) does not apply when the case involves any
litigant who is an alien. Subsection (a)(1) authorizes jurisdiction in cases
involving only State—State with a capital “S”, as in the United
States34—citizens. If an alien litigant is present in the suit, jurisdiction
must be found under (a)(2) or (a)(3).
Subsection (a)(2) is the congressional grant of pure alienage
jurisdiction.35 Pure alienage jurisdiction exists when all litigants on one
side are State citizens and all litigants on the other side are aliens.36 It
does not authorize jurisdiction between State citizens. If State citizens
28

Subsection (a)(4) is outside the scope of this article. It authorizes jurisdiction when
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the civil action is between a “foreign
state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4).
29
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1993)
(discussing underlying statutory framework).
30
See id. (noting that the proper inquiry is whether the party alignment satisfies one
of § 1332(a)’s pigeonholes).
31
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
32
Id.
33
Owen Equip. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978).
34
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
35
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2006).
36
See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989); Allendale
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1993).
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are present on both sides, jurisdiction depends upon either (a)(1) or
(a)(3). Nor does (a)(2) authorize jurisdiction when aliens are present on
both sides.37 If a case involves aliens on both sides, jurisdiction can only
be proper under (a)(3).
Subsection (a)(3) is the grant of diversity-alienage hybrid
jurisdiction. This subsection grants jurisdiction when the case would
satisfy diversity jurisdiction among State citizens but also involves
aliens.38 To trigger (a)(3), State citizens must be present on both sides of
the case, and complete diversity must exist among those State citizens.39
This trigger is needed because (a)(3) uses the same language as (a)(1),
“citizens of different States.”40 Under subsection (a)(3), provided the
trigger is present (completely diverse State citizens on both sides),
jurisdiction is proper even if aliens are additional parties.41 It is in this
situation that the above-mentioned generalization fails. Under the plain
language of (a)(3), the presence of aliens on both sides of the case does
not destroy jurisdiction.42 For example, suppose the suit involves two
plaintiffs—one a Citizen of State X and one nonresident alien—versus
two defendants—one a citizen of State Y and one nonresident alien.
Applying (a)(3), jurisdiction would be proper because the suit contains
completely diverse State citizens on both sides, and aliens are additional
parties.43 Conversely, suppose the suit involves a Citizen of State X and a
nonresident alien as plaintiffs and only a nonresident alien as defendant.
Now, jurisdiction is improper, but not because the presence of aliens on
both sides is always fatal, but rather because now this case simply does
not trigger subsection (a)(3), which is the only subsection that allows
aliens to be on both sides.44
Several rules emerge from synthesizing these subsections. First,
jurisdiction is never proper under § 1332 when citizens of the same State
37
See Allendale Mutual, 10 F.3d at 428 (rejecting jurisdiction when the suit involved
an alien versus an alien and citizen).
38
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3).
39
See Newman-Green, Inc., 490 U.S. at 828.
40
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), (3).
41
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 106 F.3d 494, 497-500
(3d Cir. 1997).
42
Id.; Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1982); see
Karaznos v. Madison Two Assocs., 147 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1998); Israel Aircraft
Indus. Ltd. v. Sanwa Bus Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Hunter
v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1952); Nancy M. Berkley, Note, Federal
Jurisdiction Over Suits Between Diverse United States Citizens With Aliens Joined to
Both Sides of the Controversy Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3), 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 71, 94
(1985) (noting that the purpose of § 1332(a)(3) was to provide a federal forum for diverse
United States citizens irrespective of their involvement with alien parties).
43
See cases cited supra note 42.
44
Karaznos, 147 F.3d at 627.
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are present on both sides of a suit. Both (a)(1) and (a)(3) require
complete diversity, and (a)(2) applies only to pure alienage situations.
Second, jurisdiction is never proper in a suit only between aliens. No
subsection authorizes such a suit, and for good reason—the Constitution
does not authorize Congress to grant jurisdiction in a suit only between
aliens.45 Third, when aliens are present on both sides of the case,
jurisdiction is only proper when completely diverse State citizens appear
on both sides of the dispute, triggering § 1332(a)(3).46
The discussion thus far has assumed the citizenship of the parties.
The next subpart works backwards to detail how the court classifies the
citizenship of various parties.
(2) Classifying Citizenship
Before a court can evaluate whether a case fits one of the § 1332(a)
subsections, it must classify the citizenship of each party. Because of this
Article’s scope, I will focus only upon classifying the citizenship of
corporations and individuals, beginning with the law before the deeming
provisions and then focusing specifically upon the deeming provisions
and how they impact the citizenship classification in cases involving
permanent-resident aliens and international corporations.
Corporations. Before Congress added the corporate deeming
provision in 1958, all corporations were citizens only of their places of
incorporation.47 So, a corporation incorporated in a State was only a
citizen of that State, while a corporation incorporated abroad was an
alien for § 1332 purposes.48 After classifying citizenship in the place of
incorporation, courts could easily apply the § 1332(a) subcategories.
In 1958, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by adding the
corporate deeming provision, providing:
[A] corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it
has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal
place of business.49
45

See cases cited supra note 23.
E.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 764 F.2d 1148, 1151 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985)
(Section “1332(a)(3) is inapplicable in this case because United States citizens are not on
both sides of the controversy.”).
47
See FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3624 (discussing pre-1958 law) &
3626 (discussing the unusual circumstance of a corporation incorporated under multiple
states’ laws).
48
S.S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 121 (1882) (A “corporation of a foreign State
is, for purposes of jurisdiction in the courts of the United States, to be deemed,
constructively, a citizen or subject of such State.”); Lewis v. Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 107 F.
Supp. 465, 470 (W.D. La. 1952).
49
28 U.S.C. § 1332, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (1958).
46
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Historical context and legislative history reveal that Congress added
the corporate deeming provision to remove a certain category of cases
from federal jurisdiction.50 Because of the long-standing pre-1958 rule
that a corporation was only a citizen of its place of incorporation,
diversity existed in cases where it was not needed to avoid local bias.51
For example, suppose a corporation is headquartered in State X and
conducts essentially all of its operations in State X, but for practical
reasons is incorporated in State Y. Before 1958, though the corporation
was essentially at home in State X and could not fear local bias in State
X, diversity jurisdiction would have existed over a suit between the
corporation and another State X citizen. By deeming the corporation a
State X citizen, “Congress intended to limit the diversity jurisdiction . . .
to those out-of-state citizens who should be free of local bias.”52
The corporate deeming provision creates no complexities when
corporate parties are either purely domestic or purely foreign. When a
corporation is purely domestic, meaning it has both a domestic
incorporation and domestic principal place of business, the corporate
deeming provision deems the corporation a citizen of the State (or States)
where it is incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place
of business. For example, a corporation incorporated in Delaware with a
principal place of business in Texas is a dual citizen of Delaware and
Texas, and thus jurisdiction would fail if any litigant on the other side
were a Delaware or Texas citizen.53 Similarly, purely foreign
corporations, meaning corporations that have both a foreign
incorporation and principal place of business, are simply aliens.
But that capital-S term “State” has created problems in cases
involving international corporations.54 Does the corporate deeming
provision apply to foreign corporations? If so, does a foreign corporation
with a domestic principal place of business have dual citizenship as both
an alien and State citizen? What about a domestically incorporated
corporation with a principal place of business abroad? Does the corporate
50
See generally The Federal Courts Jurisdiction Clarification Act: Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop., 109th Cong. 67, No. 109-67
(November 15, 2005), at 4 (Testimony of the Hon. Janet C. Hall).
51
See Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1981) (“‘The
underlying purpose of diversity of citizenship legislation . . . is to provide a separate
forum for out-of-State citizens against the prejudices of local courts and local juries by
making available to them the benefits and safeguards of the Federal Courts. Whatever the
effectiveness of this rule, it was never intended to extend to local corporations which,
because of a legal fiction, are considered citizens of another State.’” (citing S. REP. NO.
1830, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101-02.)).
52
Id. at 35.
53
See supra pp. 84-85.
54
See, e.g., Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 979 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1992).
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deeming provision, while removing jurisdiction in some cases, actually
create jurisdiction that did not exist before the corporate deeming
provision? Part II explores these problems and surveys the relevant case
law. Part III presents my solutions.
Individuals. Individuals generally fit within one of four categories:
(1) United States citizens domiciled in a State; (2) United States citizens
domiciled abroad; (3) nonresident aliens; or (4) permanent-resident
aliens.55 A United States citizen domiciled in a State is a citizen of that
State for diversity purposes.56 A United States citizen domiciled abroad
is a citizen of nowhere, and that citizen’s presence in the lawsuit destroys
jurisdiction under § 1332 regardless of the citizenship of the remaining
parties.57 Nonresident aliens (meaning a citizen or subject of a foreign
state not admitted to the United States for permanent residence) are
aliens.58 When a lawsuit involves only parties in these first three
categories, the § 1332(a) subsections can be neatly evaluated under the
framework provided in the previous subpart.
Permanent-resident aliens present more complex problems because
of the 1988 amendment adding the permanent-resident deeming
provision. Before 1988, for jurisdictional purposes, an alien was an alien.
That is, if a litigant was a “citizen or subject of a foreign state,” the
litigant was an alien. Neither the alien’s domicile nor status as a
permanent resident affected the alien’s citizenship.59 In 1988, Congress
added the permanent-resident deeming provision, which provides: “[A]n
alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be
deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.”60 What
impact does this provision have on classifying a permanent-resident
alien’s citizenship?
The permanent-resident deeming provision creates no complexities
in the class of cases in which it was apparently intended to apply. Like
the purpose of the corporate deeming provision, the purpose of the
55

Two additional categories, though less common, exist. First, the unusual problem
of dual nationals is addressed later in Part III.B.2. Second, a person may be a “homeless
wanderer” with no nationality, thus making her a citizen of nowhere, akin to the United
States citizen domiciled abroad. See Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F. Supp.
496, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
56
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989); Mas v. Perry,
489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974).
57
Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1990).
58
“[A] person is considered a citizen or subject of a foreign nation if he or she is
accorded that status by the laws or government of that country.” FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3611 at 507-09.
59
C.H. Nichols Lumber Co. v. Franson, 203 U.S. 278, 283 (1906); Sadat v. Mertes,
615 F.2d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1980).
60
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
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permanent-resident deeming provision was to carve out a narrow
category of essentially local disputes. Because of the pre-1988 an-alienis-an-alien rule, jurisdiction existed under § 1332 where it was not
needed to avoid local bias. For example, suppose a permanent-resident
alien is domiciled in State X. Before 1988, though the permanentresident alien was at home in State X and could not fear local bias there,
jurisdiction would have existed over a suit between a United States
citizen domiciled in State X and the permanent-resident alien. Congress
added the deeming provision because it saw “no apparent reason why
actions between persons who are permanent residents of the same State
should be heard by Federal courts merely because one of them remains a
citizen or subject of a foreign state.”61 All courts agree that the deeming
provision removes jurisdiction over this category of cases, in which a
permanent-resident alien domiciled in a State sues a citizen of the same
State.
But Congress apparently never considered what effect the
permanent-resident deeming provision would have on a case involving a
permanent-resident alien on one side and an alien on the other. Does the
permanent-resident deeming provision, while removing some disputes
from § 1332, actually create jurisdiction in some cases where jurisdiction
did not exist before 1988? Part II explores these problems and surveys
the relevant case law. Part III presents my solutions.
II. DETAILING THE STRUGGLE
As demonstrated earlier, the deeming provisions govern the
citizenship classification of international corporations and permanentresident aliens. In some cases, the deeming provisions interact
uncontroversially with the § 1332(a) subcategories to remove jurisdiction
that would have existed before the deeming provisions. The cases that
have troubled the courts, though, involve a different situation—one party
argues that the deeming provisions interact with the subsections to create
jurisdiction where jurisdiction would not have existed before the
deeming provisions. In the two subparts below, I will explore the
struggles involved with the two deeming provisions. In Part III, I will
propose a solution that synthesizes the two provisions, highlight the
lurking missing-word problem, and return to apply my solution to the
categories formed in Part II. The charts that follow the Article track this
structure.

61

Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing 134 CONG. REC.
S16284, 16299 (1988)).
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A. International Corporations
The corporate deeming provision provides: “a corporation shall be
deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of
the State where it has its principal place of business.”62 Two types of
international corporations exist. First, a foreign corporation (meaning a
corporation incorporated by a foreign state) may have its principal place
of business63 in a State. And second, a domestic corporation may have a
foreign principal place of business.
(1) Foreign Corporation with Domestic Principal Place of Business
Two underlying questions exist. First, does the corporate deeming
provision apply at all to foreign corporations? And second, if it does
apply, does it create dual citizenship for a foreign corporation with a
domestic principal place of business?
The first question, despite initial mixed results, has been settled—
the corporate deeming provision does apply to foreign corporations. In
Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., the first court to address
this question determined that the corporate deeming provision did not
apply to foreign corporations at all.64 Following reasoning that has been
overwhelmingly rejected,65 the court concluded that, even if a foreign
62
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). The proposed amendment mentioned in note 13, H.R. 5440,
would fix the ambiguities in this area by expressly deeming corporations citizens of
foreign states: “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign
state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its
principal place of business.” H.R. 5440, supra note 13, § 3(1).
63
A corporation can have only one principal place of business. It is now settled that
the inquiry seeks the corporation’s worldwide principal place of business. Lee v. Trans
Am. Trucking Serv., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 135, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); R.W. Sawant &
Co. v. Ben Kozloff, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 614, 616 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Richmond Constr. Corp.
v. Hilb, 482 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Arab Int’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l
Westminister Bank Ltd., 463 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); David Crystal, Inc. v.
Cunard S.S. Co., 223 F. Supp. 273, 289 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). A few early courts and
commentators suggested that the court should seek out the corporation’s principal place
of business within the United States, Simon Holding P.L.C. Group of Cos. U.K. v. Klenz,
878 F. Supp. 210 (M.D. Fla. 1995), but this approach has been correctly rejected. To
illustrate, suppose a corporation was incorporated in Mexico, and had 99.9% of its
operations in Mexico, but had a single United States “place of business,” a one-person
office in Texas. If the inquiry sought the corporation’s principal place of business within
the United States, the corporation would be deemed a Texas citizen. See generally
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3628.
64
Eisenberg v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 189 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
65
Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Commc’ns. Corp., 979 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1992);
Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1558-61 (11th Cir. 1989); Torres v. S.
Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Rouhi v. Harza Eng’g Co.,
785 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1992); see also FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3628.
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corporation has a principal place of business in a State, it is not a citizen
of that State. It is instead only an alien because, while the corporate
deeming provision deems the corporation a citizen of the State where it
has its principal place of business, the corporate deeming provision does
not apply to foreign corporations.66
I accept as settled the nearly uniform rejection of Eisenberg and
evaluate the second question, on which a dispute exists. The question is
not whether the corporate deeming provision applies to foreign
corporations. Instead, the question is how it applies. With Eisenberg out
of the picture, two potential solutions apply to classifying the citizenship
of a foreign corporation with a principal place of business in State X: (1)
the foreign corporation could be classified as only a citizen of State X; or
(2) the foreign corporation could be classified as a dual citizen, as a
citizen of State X and an alien. Both of these solutions treat, as they
must, a corporation as a citizen of the State where it has its principal
place of business—the plain language of § 1332(c) (and its capital-S
State) demand it. The underlying question is whether the corporation
retains its alien status or whether the deeming provision strips the
corporation of its preexisting alien status. With this context in mind, I
explore the decisions in the context of common party alignments to
examine the different constructions of the deeming provisions and the
results generated by combining those constructions with the § 1332(a)
subcategories.
Foreign corporation with principal place of business in State X v.
United States Citizen domiciled in State X. Under both of the two
potential solutions mentioned above, jurisdiction fails. Whether the
foreign corporation is only a citizen of State X or is both a citizen of
State X and an alien, citizens of State X still appear on both sides, and
the case therefore fits none of the § 1332(a) subcategories.67
Accordingly, once they have rejected Eisenberg, courts have
unanimously held jurisdiction improper in this scenario.68 Notably,
before 1958, jurisdiction would have been proper in this scenario, but
now it is not.
Foreign Corporation with principal place of business in State X v.
nonresident alien. In this scenario, the answer depends upon which of the
two potential solutions a court has chosen. Most courts have chosen the
66

Eisenberg, 189 F. Supp. at 502.
See supra pp. 84-85.
68
Danjaq, 979 F.2d at 773; Vareka v. Am. Inv. Props. 724 F.2d 907, 910 (11th Cir.
1984); Trans Am. Trucking Serv Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d at 139; Petroleum & Energy
Intelligence Weekly, Inc. v. Liscom, 762 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); S.E. Guar.
Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1005-06 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
67
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second solution, treating the foreign corporation as both an alien and a
citizen of State X.69 Under this approach, jurisdiction fails because aliens
appear on both sides and the alignment does not satisfy § 1332(a)(3).70
For example, in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., alien plaintiffs sued
Esso Tankers, a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in
New Jersey.71 The Fifth Circuit held that Esso Tankers, “though a citizen
of New Jersey, is to be regarded as a citizen of Liberia as well.”72
Because aliens appeared on both sides and the alignment did not satisfy §
1332(a)(3), jurisdiction failed.73
A few courts have chosen the first solution, treating the corporation
only as a citizen of State X. Under this approach, jurisdiction would be
proper under § 1332(a)(2) because it would be a suit between a State
citizen and an alien.74 One example, Trans World Hospital Supplies Ltd.
v. Hospital Corp. of America,75 through its omission of a step helps to
illustrate the interaction of the corporate deeming provision and the
subsections. There, an alien sued the defendant corporation, which was
incorporated abroad and had its principal place of business in
Tennessee.76 After rejecting Eisenberg and concluding that the corporate
deeming provision does apply to foreign corporations, the court held that
“[d]espite its incorporation in a foreign country, if an alien corporation
maintains its principal place of business in a state of the United States, no
compelling reason exists that it should not be deemed a citizen of that
state.”77 Thus, the court found jurisdiction proper under § 1332(a)(2).
The Trans World court skipped a vital step. No plausible post-Eisenberg
dispute exists about whether the alien corporation was a Tennessee
citizen—the plain text of the corporate deeming provision demands it.
The skipped step was determining whether the corporation was only a
Tennessee citizen or whether the corporation was both an alien and a
Tennessee citizen. A familiar analogy is helpful. Suppose our plaintiff is
a Texas citizen. Our defendant is incorporated in Texas and has its
principal place of business in Nebraska. Under Trans World, the inquiry
would seemingly stop once we determine that “no compelling reason
69
Danjaq, 979 F.2d 772; Vareka Invs., 724 F.2d 907 (11th Cir. 1984); Petroleum &
Energy Intelligence, 762 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); S.E. Guar. Trust Co., 358 F.
Supp. 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
70
See supra pp. 84-85.
71
764 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir. 1985).
72
Id. at 1152.
73
Id.
74
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
75
542 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
76
Id. at 871.
77
Id. at 878.
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exists” not to deem the defendant a Nebraska citizen. But of course
jurisdiction fails because the defendant is also a Texas citizen.
While the Trans World approach is flawed, it does, through its
omission, help highlight the proper path. Returning to our hypothetical,
our plaintiff is an alien. Before 1958, jurisdiction would have been
improper because this would have been a forbidden suit between aliens,
the corporation being an alien because of its foreign incorporation. We
know now that the corporate deeming provision deems the defendant a
State X citizen. The precise issue is whether: (1) the corporate deeming
provision strips the corporation’s preexisting alien status, makes the
corporation only a citizen of State X, and therefore expands jurisdiction;
or (2) whether the deeming provision adds State X citizenship to the
corporation, but does not strip alienage status and therefore does not
expand jurisdiction.
(2) Domestic Corporation with Foreign Principal Place of Business
This situation has arisen infrequently, but deserves mention.
Suppose our plaintiff is incorporated in State X and has its principal
place of business abroad. Again, two potential solutions exist: (1) the
corporation could be classified as only a citizen of State X; or (2) the
corporation could be classified as both an alien and State X citizen.78 The
courts that have directly addressed this issue have correctly concluded
that a domestic corporation with its principal place of business abroad
has only a single citizenship in its State of incorporation.79 Under this
approach, jurisdiction does not exist when the corporation sues a State X
citizen, but does exist when the corporation sues an alien. Both of these
results are the same as they would have been before 1958. I explore this
scenario further in Part III.
B. Permanent-Resident Aliens
As does the corporate deeming provision, the permanent-resident
deeming provision applies uncontroversially to remove certain
essentially local disputes from § 1332. The problems have arisen when
alien litigants are present on the side opposite the permanent-resident
alien. In this situation, some courts have construed the permanentresident deeming provision to create jurisdiction where it would not have

78

No plausible argument exists that the corporation is only an alien.
Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1997); Cabalceta v.
Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1989); Lebanese Am. Univ. v. Nat’l
Evangelical Synod of Syria & Lebanon, No. 04 Civ.5434 RJH, 2005 WL 39917, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2005); Willems v. Barclays Bank, 263 F. Supp. 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
79
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existed before 1958.80 For context, I will first briefly revisit the
uncontroversial application. Then I will examine the split in authority in
the controversial cases. As before, two potential solutions exist to
classifying the citizenship of a permanent-resident alien domiciled in
State X: (1) the permanent-resident alien could be classified as only a
State X citizen; or (2) the permanent-resident alien could be classified as
a dual citizen, as a citizen of State X and an alien.
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. United States
Citizen domiciled in State X. This is the uncontroversial situation, and
indeed is the situation Congress targeted with the permanent-resident
deeming provision. Under both of the potential solutions mentioned
above, jurisdiction fails. Even if the permanent-resident alien is only a
citizen of State X, State X citizens still appear on both sides, and the case
therefore fits none of the § 1332(a) categories.81 Courts have uniformly
concluded that jurisdiction fails in this scenario.82 Notably, pure alienage
jurisdiction would have existed before 1988 because the permanentresident alien was an alien.83
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. Nonresident Alien.
In this scenario, the answer depends upon which of the potential
solutions the court chooses. Most courts have concluded that jurisdiction
80
The proposed amendment mentioned in note 13, H.R. 5440, would remove the
existing ambiguities by removing the permanent-resident deeming provision entirely.
Rather than relying upon a deeming provision to remove the local disputes, the
amendment would expressly carve them out. Amended § 1332(a)(2) would thus grant
jurisdiction when the amount-in-controversy is satisfied and the suit is between
citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the
district courts shall not have original jurisdiction of an action between a
citizen of a State and a citizen or subject of a foreign state admitted to the
United States for permanent residence and domiciled in the same State.
H.R. 5440, §§ (1)-(2) (emphasis added).
81
See supra pp. 84-85.
82
Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1993); Gall v. Topcall Int’l,
A.G., No. 04-CV-432, 2005 WL 664502, at *5, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2005); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (S.D. Ind. 2003); Marcus v. “Five J”
Jewelers Precious Metals Indus. Ltd., 111 F. Supp. 2d 445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); China
Nuclear Energy Indus. Corp. v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258 (D.
Colo. 1998); Engstrom v. Hornseth, 959 F. Supp. 545, 549 (D.P.R. 1997); Saadeh v.
Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 935 F. Supp.
458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Paparella v. Idreco Inv. S.p.A., 858 F. Supp. 283, 284 (D.
Mass. 1994); Lloyds Bank P.L.C. v. Norkin, 817 F. Supp. 414, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
Song v. Kim, No. 93-19, 1993 WL 526340, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 1993); Arai v.
Tachibana, 778 F. Supp. 1535, 1540 (D. Haw. 1991); see also Adolph v. Yung, 81 F.3d
167 (9th Cir. 1996); Samudio v. O’Loughlin, No. 96-C-2958, 1997 WL 136308 (N.D.Ill
Mar. 18, 1997); Jyan v. Frankovich, No. C-94-20883-JW, 1994 WL 705292 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 12, 1994).
83
C.H. Nichols Lumber Co. v. Franson, 203 U.S. 278, 282-83 (1906); Sadat v.
Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1980).
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fails, at least implicitly choosing the second option and treating the
permanent-resident alien as both an alien and a citizen of State X.84
Under this approach, jurisdiction fails because aliens appear on both
sides, unless the alignment satisfies § 1332(a)(3). A few courts have
chosen the first solution, impliedly treating the permanent-resident alien
as only a citizen of State X.85 Under this approach, pure alienage
jurisdiction exists because a suit exists between an alien (the nonresident
alien) and a State citizen (the permanent-resident alien). Notably, before
the deeming provision, jurisdiction would not have existed in this
scenario because an alien was an alien.
The decisions in this area are troubling—even those that reach the
correct result. The prevailing template has been to conclude that the
permanent-resident deeming provision’s “clear” and “unambiguous” text
favors finding jurisdiction and then to evaluate whether extra-textual
reasons justify departing from the clear text. Some courts have concluded
that they are bound by the clear text, though they do not evaluate the text
in any detail, instead generalizing broadly about how the neglected text
comports with congressional intent. Other courts, uncritically conceding
textual clarity, nonetheless depart from it because of the compelling
extra-textual reasons. After setting forth the two diverging circuit
decisions below, I will demonstrate in Part III that the template is wrong.
Neither answer is textually preferable. Here again we encounter the
missing-word problem. The extra-textual reasons are not extra-textual at
all; rather they are contextual factors to examine when construing an
ambiguous text.
In Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, the Third Circuit held that
jurisdiction was proper when a permanent resident alien domiciled in
Virginia sued two defendants: a German corporation and a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey.86 The
court held that the plain meaning of § 1332(a) clearly deemed the
permanent resident alien a citizen of Virginia—and apparently only a
citizen of Virginia. Therefore, this was a case between citizens of
different States in which an alien was an additional party.
Although finding the answer textually compelled, the Singh court
continued to examine the provision’s legislative history and concluded
that the 1988 amendments were intended only to make “modest
84

See Gall, 2005 WL 664502 at *6; China Nuclear, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1259-60;
Engstrom, 959 F. Supp. at 553; Saadeh, 107 F.3d at 60 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Lloyds Bank,
817 F. Supp at 419.
85
See Singh, 9 F.3d at 312; In re Bridgestone, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (S.D. Ind.
2003); Song, 1993 WL 526340, at *4.
86
Singh, 9 F.3d at 312.
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adjustments to the scope of diversity jurisdiction.”87 Importantly, the
court recognized the potential unconstitutional application of the
permanent-resident deeming provision when a permanent-resident alien
sues another alien. The court disregarded these potential problems,
however, stating “[t]he alleged constitutional issue that might arise when
one alien sues another is not presented in this case because there is a
citizen party, thereby satisfying minimal diversity.”88 Thus, the Court
refused to apply the canon of constitutional avoidance because applying
the statute to these parties would not be unconstitutional even if the
court’s construction of the statute might lead to unconstitutional results
with other parties.
Other courts have disagreed with Singh and refused jurisdiction
when an alien was adverse to the permanent-resident alien. Without
much analysis, those courts have followed the template, uncritically
assuming that the “textual” answer is the one favoring jurisdiction,89 but
have departed for extra-textual reasons. For example, in the only similar
case to reach the circuit level, the D.C. Circuit held that subject-matter
jurisdiction did not exist when a nonresident alien plaintiff sued a
permanent-resident alien domiciled in Maryland.90 While the court noted
that the literal language of the statute created jurisdiction, it found that
Congress did not “intend” to create jurisdiction in this situation.91 The
court justified looking beyond the language of the statute, and
determined “‘[w]here the literal reading of a statutory term would
‘compel an odd result,’ . . . we must search for other evidence of
congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.”92
Generally courts that have gone beyond the text of the statute93
have done so for the two reasons mentioned in Singh. First, applying the
language “literally” could violate the Constitution by creating
87

Id. at 307 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 312.
89
See China Nuclear, 11 F. Supp. at 1258 (“[I]f applied as written the amendment
authorized jurisdiction in cases where neither party is a citizen of the United States.”);
Lloyds Bank, 817 F. Supp. 416-417 (“Under the literal application of 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a), amended as set forth above, this Court plainly has subject matter jurisdiction:
under that section, the action is brought by an alien (Lloyds) against a citizen of
Connecticut (Mr. Norkin) and a citizen of New York (Ms. Norkin, by virtue of section
1332(a)), so that complete diversity exists.”). See also Singh, 9 F.3d 303; Gall, 2005 WL
664501 at *5; In re Bridgestone, 247 F. Supp. at 1076; China Nuclear, 11 F.Supp. at
1258; Engstrom, 959 F. Supp. at 550; Saadeh, 107 F.3d at 55; Buti, 935 F. Supp. at 462;
Song, 1993 WL 526340 at *4; Arai, 778 F. Supp. at 1542.
90
Saadeh, 107 F.3d at 61.
91
Id. at 60.
92
Id. at 58.
93
E.g., China Nuclear, 11 F. Supp. 1256; Engstrom, 959 F. Supp 545; Buti, 935 F.
Supp. 458; Lloyds Bank, 817 F. Supp. 414; Arai, 778 F. Supp. 1535.
88
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jurisdiction in a suit solely between aliens. Second, the courts have
looked at the legislative history and concluded Congress’s intent was to
limit jurisdiction, not to expand it.94
As discussed in Part III, the template is wrong. The courts have
overlooked the missing-word problem. They have implicitly read the
permanent-resident deeming provision to “clearly” contain the word
“only.” When the clear-text barrier disappears, the constitutional
problems and legislative history can be viewed properly, as contextual
tools used to determine the most reasonable meaning of the phrase “shall
be deemed.”
III. A SOLUTION
As noted in the introduction, my solution is modest in that the
results it produces are consistent with the results reached by the majority
in each category mentioned in Part II. Thus, the approach does not
require radical changes, but still produces several benefits. First, it
provides a reasoned, principled approach that provides more guidance
than the what-did-Congress-intend free for all that has infiltrated these
areas. Second, it synthesizes the two provisions, which have thus far
been analyzed independently, and gives the phrase “shall be deemed” a
consistent meaning. And third, it avoids the constitutional problems that
arise from other solutions.
The deeming provisions provide:
[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by
which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business . . . .95
[A]n alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence
shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is
domiciled.96

My solution is simple. The key to understanding it is recognizing
two things. First, before Congress added the deeming provisions, law
outside of § 1332 created alien status for certain litigants. Specifically,
though no statute so provided, a corporation incorporated abroad was

94
Some courts have also articulated a third reason. Specifically, they argue that
Congress would not have abrogated the longstanding rule of complete diversity without
discussion. See In re Bridgestone, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1073. This articulation is circular.
The deeming provisions impact the first step—classifying citizenship, not what party
alignments satisfy the subsections.
95
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
96
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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historically classified as an alien.97 Also, an individual who was a citizen
or subject of a foreign state was an alien, despite being a domiciliary or
permanent resident of the United States (that is, an alien was an alien).
Second, to resolve the highlighted jurisdictional questions, the court must
insert a word after the statutory phrase “shall be deemed” before the
court can examine the subcategories. That missing word is either “only”
or “also.” By passing the deeming provisions, Congress “deemed”
litigants citizens of certain States, thus removing certain categories of
cases from jurisdiction. Had Congress written “shall be deemed [only]”
in the relevant deeming provisions—as it did in § 1332(c)(2) when
“deeming” estate representatives citizens of certain states98—the
provisions would operate not only to reduce jurisdiction in some cases,
but also to create jurisdiction in others. By deeming a litigant “only” a
citizen of certain States, Congress would be stripping some litigants of
alien statuses they possessed before the deeming provisions were passed.
But the best reading of the provisions, considering context and
consequences, is that Congress meant to confer additional citizenship on
the litigants without stripping preexisting alien status. If historical
reasons outside of § 1332 give a litigant alien status, the deeming
provisions deem the litigant [also] a citizen of certain States. Both
constructions (the [only] and [also] constructions) require inserting an
additional word, but the latter is easily superior, as demonstrated below.
The following subsections (and the summarizing chart) detail my
construction in all of the categories mentioned in Part II. In Subpart A, I
apply my construction to international corporations. In Subpart B, I
repeat the process for permanent-resident aliens. Within Subparts A and
B, I will first briefly summarize the citizenship determination. Then, I
will detail how the citizenship determination interacts with the
subsections and how my approach comports with the results most courts
have reached in the categories described in Part II. Also, within each, I
will consider and respond to potential counterarguments. In part C, I
conclude by examining the results of giving the words “shall be deemed”
a consistent construction in both deeming provisions.

97
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88,
98 (2002) (citing Nat’l S.S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118 (1882)).
98
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (2006).
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A. International Corporations
(1) Classifying the Citizenship of International Corporations
Historically, a corporation was considered to be a citizen of its
place of incorporation, whether domestic or foreign.99 If incorporated in
a foreign state, a corporation was an alien. And before the corporate
deeming provision, a corporation’s principal place of business was
irrelevant.
Under my construction, the corporate deeming provision: (1) deems
the corporation a citizen of any capital-S State where it is incorporated
and (if it has a domestic principal place of business)100 of the capital-S
State where it has its principal place of business; but (2) does not strip a
corporation of any alien status that existed before the deeming provision.
Thus, a foreign corporation with a principal place of business in State X
is both an alien and a Citizen of State X because the corporate deeming
provision deems the corporation a Citizen of State X, but does not deem
it “only” a Citizen of State X. The deeming provision does not divest the
corporation of its preexisting alien status. Conversely, a corporation
incorporated in State A with a principal place of business abroad has
only single citizenship. The deeming provision “deems” the corporation
a Citizen of State A, but now there is no historical reason to treat the
corporation as an alien and the corporate deeming provision does not
deem the corporation an alien because it only applies to capital “S”
states.
(2) Plugging it into the Subcategories
Having determined the citizenship of the international corporation
above, I now evaluate the result under the § 1332(a) subcategories,
comparing the results under my approach with the results reached in Part
II and with the law before the deeming provisions. The reader should
assume the existence of no unmentioned parties that might trigger §
1332(a)(3).
Foreign corporation with PPB in State X v. U.S. Citizen Domiciled
in State X. Under my approach, the foreign corporation has dual
citizenship, as both an alien and State X citizen. Because citizens of State
X appear on both sides, jurisdiction fails. This result is not
controversial.101 Jurisdiction fails because the foreign corporation is

99
100
101

J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 536 U.S. at 98.
See supra note 62.
See cases cited supra note 68.
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deemed a citizen of State X, and it matters not whether it is deemed
[only] or [also] a citizen of State X.
Foreign corporation with PPB in State X v. Nonresident Alien.
Under my approach, again, the foreign corporation has dual citizenship,
as both an alien and State X citizen. Because aliens appear on both sides
and because § 1332(a)(3) does not apply, jurisdiction fails. In this
scenario, the choice of bracketed words matters. If the foreign
corporation is deemed [only] a citizen of State X, the corporate deeming
provision strips the corporation of alien status, and pure alienage
jurisdiction exists under § 1332(a)(2). Most, but not all, courts have
agreed with my conclusion.102
Finding no jurisdiction is the better answer. First, before 1958,
jurisdiction would not have existed, and the historical context and
reasonable inferences from the text and structure suggest that Congress
intended to reduce, not expand, jurisdiction. Second, just lines below the
corporate deeming provision, another provision deems estate
representatives “only” citizens of certain states, suggesting—at the very
least—that courts should search for a principled basis before determining
that “shall be deemed” means “shall be deemed [only].”103 Another
reason for refusing jurisdiction is bound up with the construction of the
permanent-resident deeming provision. As discussed in the next subpart,
compelling constitutional-avoidance reasons exist to read the permanentresident deeming provision as “deemed [also],” and thus consistency and
coherence support the same reading of the corporate deeming provision.
Corporation incorporated in State X with PPB abroad v. U.S.
Citizen Domiciled in State X. Under my approach, the corporation has a
single citizenship, in State X. Because citizens of State X appear on both
sides, jurisdiction fails. This result is not controversial because even if
one were to consider the corporation a dual citizen, jurisdiction would
still fail because State X citizens would be on both sides.
Corporation incorporated in State X with PPB abroad v.
Nonresident Alien. Under my approach, the corporation has a single
citizenship, in State X. Thus, pure alienage jurisdiction exists under §
102

See, e.g., Danjaq, S.A. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 979 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1992);
Vareka v. Am. Inv. Prop., 724 F.2d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1984); Petroleum & Energy
Intelligence Weekly, Inc. v. Liscom, 762 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); S.E. Guar. Trust
Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1005-1006 (N.D. Ill. 1973). But cf.
TransWorld Hosp. Supplies Ltd. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 542 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn.
1982).
103
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[Where] Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (citation omitted).
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1332(a)(2) between a State citizen (the corporation) and an alien (the
nonresident alien). The courts that have squarely addressed the issue
agree.104 Some courts, however, have suggested in dicta that a
domestically incorporated corporation with a principal place of business
abroad also has dual citizenship.105 No legal basis supports this
conclusion. Before 1958, a corporation was a citizen only of its State or
foreign country of incorporation. The corporate deeming provision
deems the corporation a citizen of any capital-S State where it is
incorporated and (if it has a domestic principal place of business) of the
capital-S State where it has its principal place of business.106 Neither the
corporate deeming provision nor pre-1958 law creates alien status for a
corporation that has its principal place of business abroad.
Conceptually, some may find troubling the distinction between a
domestically incorporated corporation with a principal place of business
abroad and a foreign corporation with a domestic principal place of
business. But the alternative constructions of the current statute are more
troubling.107 For simplicity and to treat all corporations equally, courts
could follow the alternative suggested in dicta in the immediately
preceding paragraph and simply give all international corporations dual
citizenships. The problem with that approach is that there is no basis for
doing so.108 This alternative does not merely choose between permissible
interpretations of the law, it makes a new law. Second, courts could
avoid the distinction by reading the corporate deeming provision as
deeming international corporations [only] a citizen of capital S states.
This alternative is troubling for the reasons outlined earlier. The most
unsatisfactory alternative is the one that seems to pervade many of the
opinions in this area—because the text is unclear, the court simply asks if
exercising jurisdiction in this situation would be wise. Certainly, when
determining a statute’s meaning courts must consider the potential
104
See, e.g., Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1989);
Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
105
E.g. Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987,
990 (9th Cir. 1994).
106
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
107
The proposed amendment, H.R. 5440, would eliminate this anomaly by removing
any distinction between states and foreign states from the corporate-citizenship inquiry.
See supra note 13. Thus, the amendment would produce the same result as my solution,
except that a domestic corporation with a principal place of business abroad would be a
dual citizen under the amendment, but is only a citizen of its state of incorporation under
my solution.
108
Again, only two sources potentially impact a corporation’s citizenship, and neither
of those consider a foreign principal place of business. The corporate deeming provision
applies only to capital-S States and, historically, a foreign principal place of business was
irrelevant.
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effects of various constructions. Words mean nothing in isolation, and
evaluating the impact of words is one way to determine the most
reasonable construction to give to those words. But the end goal remains
giving meaning to the words. In the alienage area (especially in the
permanent-resident context), some courts have gone astray. They have
spotted an ambiguity, evaluated the impact of finding or rejecting
jurisdiction, and then concluded. But they have never returned to the text,
even for a post-hoc justification of how the result comports with the
statutory language. Further, even if flexible, functional approaches are
sometimes desirable, they have no place in jurisdictional inquiries. As
Judge Posner wrote:
Functional approaches to legal questions are often, perhaps
generally preferable to mechanical rules; but the preference is
reversed when it comes to jurisdiction. When it is uncertain
whether a case is within the jurisdiction of a particular court
system, not only are the cost and complexity of litigation
increased by the necessity of conducting an inquiry that will
dispel the uncertainty but the parties will often find themselves
having to start their litigation over from the beginning, perhaps
after it has gone all the way through to judgment. “Jurisdictional
rules ought to be simple and precise so that judges and lawyers
are spared having to litigate over not the merits of a legal dispute
but where and when those merits shall be litigated.” . . . “The
more mechanical the application of a jurisdiction rule, the better.
The chief and often the only virtue of a jurisdictional rule is
clarity.”109

Summarized simply, the words “shall be deemed” in the corporate
deeming provision give a corporation citizenship in certain States, but do
not remove preexisting alien status. The permanent-resident deeming
provision operates similarly.
B. Permanent-Resident Aliens
Before Congress added the permanent-resident deeming provision
in 1988, an alien was an alien. That is, if a litigant was a “citizen or
subject of a foreign state,” the litigant was an alien.110 Before 1988,
neither an alien’s domicile nor status as a permanent resident affected the
alien’s citizenship under § 1332. Thus, before 1988, once a court
determined that a litigant was a citizen or subject of a foreign state, the
court simply classified that litigant as an alien, classified the remaining
109
Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 739-40 (7th
Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
110
I defer treatment to the obscure area of dual nationals until Subsection III.C.
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parties, and looked to the § 1332(a) subcategories. What effect did the
permanent-resident deeming provision have on an alien’s classification?
The permanent-resident deeming provision provides that: “[A]n alien
admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a
citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.”111 Unquestionably,
a nonresident alien is still an alien. A nonresident alien’s domicile is still
irrelevant—a nonresident alien domiciled in State A neither loses her
alien status nor gains State A citizenship. But while a nonresident alien’s
domicile is irrelevant, once an alien has been admitted for permanent
residence,112 the alien’s domicile does impact the citizenship
classification.
This Subpart will proceed in the same manner as the previous one.
First, I will summarize the citizenship classification of permanentresident aliens under my construction of the permanent-resident deeming
provision. Then I will detail how the citizenship determination interacts
with the subsections and how my approach comports with the results
most courts have reached in the categories described in Part II. In
Subpart C, I will evaluate my solution on a larger scale, considering the
overall impact of my construction on both deeming provisions.
(1) Classifying the Citizenship of Permanent-Resident Aliens
As I have used the term “alien” when discussing the subcategories,
an alien is a citizen or subject of a foreign state. The question is what
impact the permanent-resident deeming provision has on the citizenship
classification of a permanent-resident alien domiciled in a State. My
approach treats the words “shall be deemed” in the permanent-resident
deeming provision the same as the same words in the corporate deeming
provision. The permanent-resident deeming provision adds citizenship in
the State where the alien is domiciled, but does not remove preexisting
alien status—the litigant is, after all, still a citizen or subject of a foreign
state. Thus, while a nonresident alien is just an alien, a permanentresident alien domiciled in State A has dual citizenship, as both an alien
and a Citizen of State X.

111

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (emphasis added).
Chavez-Organista v. Vanos, 208 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.P.R. 2002) (recognizing that
an alien is deemed to be a permanent resident of the United States under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) only if the alien has been accorded lawful permanent resident status under the
immigration laws, i.e., if the alien has received a green card). See also Foy v. Schantz,
Schatzman, & Aaronson, P.A., 108 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1997); Kato v. County of
Westchester, 927 F. Supp. 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)); Chan v.
Mui, No. 92 Civ. 8258 (MBM), 1993 WL 427114 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1993).
112
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I expect the reader to meet this suggestion of an individual with
dual citizenship with some resistance. But the alternatives are
unsatisfactory, as detailed throughout this and the next Subpart. The
dual-citizen result is permissible under the statutory text and avoids the
problems raised by alternative constructions.113
Starting with the text, one thing again becomes apparent. The
bracketed word is missing. Is a permanent-resident alien domiciled in
State A deemed [only] a Citizen of State X? Or, does the permanentresident alien retain her alien status while being deemed [also] a Citizen
of State X? If anything, the bracketed [also] is a more natural reading,
given the express inclusion of the phrase “shall be deemed only” in §
1332(c)(2), which provides that the legal representative of the estate of a
decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the
decedent, and the legal representative of an infant or incompetent shall
be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or
incompetent.”114 Neither approach is textually demanded. While many of
the cases detailed in Part II describe the “clear” or “unambiguous text” as
favoring one result, those cases never critically evaluate the language or
explain how the text is clear. Judge Diane Wood recently got it right,
concluding that, “[s]ome aliens will have two citizenships for diversity
purposes rather than one: that of their home country, and that of the U.S.
State in which they are domiciled.”115
I will now apply this construction to the scenarios in Part II,
demonstrate how my approach produces results consistent with the
majority results in those scenarios, and evaluate counterarguments under
each scenario on a smaller scale.
(2) Plugging it into the Subcategories
Three common variations involving permanent-resident aliens
exist. The reader should assume the existence of no unmentioned parties
that might trigger § 1332(a)(3).
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. U.S. Citizen
domiciled in State X. Under my approach, the permanent-resident alien
has dual citizenship, as both an alien and a State X citizen. Because
citizens of State X appear on both sides, jurisdiction fails. This result is
not controversial. Jurisdiction fails because the permanent-resident alien
is deemed a citizen of State X, and it matters not whether she is deemed
[only] or [also] a citizen of State X. Indeed, this is the precise scenario
113

While the proposed amendment, H.R. 5440, takes a different approach, the results
reached under 5440 are identical to those reached under my solution. See supra note 13.
114
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).
115
Karazanos v. Madison Two Assocs., 147 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1998).
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targeted by the provision,116 and courts unanimously agree that
jurisdiction does not exist here.117
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. Nonresident Alien.
Under my approach, the permanent-resident alien has dual citizenship, as
both an alien and State X citizen. Because aliens appear on both sides
and because § 1332(a)(3) does not apply, jurisdiction fails. In this
scenario, the choice of the bracketed words matters. If the permanentresident alien is deemed [only] a citizen of State X, the permanentresident deeming provision strips the permanent-resident alien of alien
status, and pure alienage jurisdiction exists under § 1332(a)(2). Most
courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have agreed with my conclusion, but
have failed to reconcile their results with the text.118 A few courts,
including the Third Circuit, have disagreed, but have failed to reconcile
their results with the text, instead using adverbial shortcuts like “clearly”
and “unambiguously.”119
Finding no jurisdiction in this situation is the better answer. First,
before 1958, jurisdiction would not have existed because an alien was an
alien. Historical context and reasonable inferences from the text and
structure suggest that Congress intended to reduce, not expand,
116
“There is no reason why actions involving persons who are permanent residents of
the United States should be heard by federal courts merely because one of them remains a
citizen or subject of a foreign state or has not yet become a citizen of the United States.”
Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (Sept. 14, 1988)).
117
See Saadeh, 107 F.3d at 55; Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303, 308 (3d Cir.
1993); Gall v. Topcall Int’l, A.G., No. 04-CV-432, 2005 WL 664502, at *5 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 21, 2005); Marcus v. “Five J” Jewelers Precious Metals Indus. Ltd., 111 F. Supp. 2d
445, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); China Nuclear Energy Indus. Corp. v. Arthur Andersen
L.L.P., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258-60 (D. Colo. 1998); Engstrom v. Hornseth, 959 F.
Supp. 545, 549 (D.P.R. 1997); Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 935 F. Supp. 458, 462
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Paparella v. Idreco Inv. S.p.A., 858 F. Supp. 283, 284 (D. Mass. 1994);
Lloyds Bank P.L.C. v. Norkin, 817 F. Supp. 414, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Song v. Kim, No.
93-19, 1993 WL 526340, at *8 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 1993); Arai v. Tachibana, 778 F. Supp.
1535, 1540 (D. Haw. 1991); see also Adolph v. Yung, 81 F.3d 167 (9th Cir. 1996);
Samudio v. O’Loughlin, No. 96-C-2958, 1997 WL 136308 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 1997);
Jyan v. Frankovich, No. C-94-20556-JW, 1994 WL 705292 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 1994).
118
See Gall, 2005 WL 664501, at *6; Marcus, 111 F. Supp. 2d 445; China Nuclear
Energy Indus. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1259-60; Ozawav v. Miyata, No. 96-C-7500,
1997 WL 779047, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1997); Saadeh, 107 F.3d at 60; Engstrom, 959
F. Supp. at 553; Lloyds Bank, 817 F. Supp. at 419.
119
See Singh, 9 F.3d 303; In re Bridgestone, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (“We find that
the Third Circuit’s opinion in Singh presents the better-reasoned analysis and should be
followed in this case.”); Song, 1993 WL 526340, at *4 (“[I]n accordance with the Third
Circuit’s rationale and decision in Singh, the Court finds [jurisdiction is proper].”); see
also Iscar, Ltd. v. Katz, 743 F. Supp. 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1990); D’Arbois v. Sommelier’s
Cellars, 741 F. Supp. 489, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dictum); Syed v. Syed, No. 91-C-2411,
1991 WL 70851, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1991) (dictum); Nakanishi v. Kanko Bus Lines,
Inc., No. 88-CIV-2073, 1989 WL 1183124, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1989) (dictum).
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jurisdiction. Specifically, the legislative history (consistent with my
reading of the text) suggests that Congress wrote the permanent-resident
deeming provision to merely remove one category of cases from §
1332—those cases where a permanent-resident alien domiciled in a State
sues a United States citizen domiciled in the same State. Under my
construction, this is all the amendment does. Second, as noted, the
permanent-resident deeming provision does not contain the shall be
deemed “only” language that appears elsewhere, and yet, only by
removing the permanent-resident alien’s alien status can a court fit this
scenario into one of the subcategories.
Most importantly, reading the provision to not divest the
permanent-resident alien of alien status avoids the constitutional
questions that pervade in this area. “[W]hen deciding which of two
plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the
necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise . . .
constitutional problems, the other should prevail.”120 Article III § 2
authorizes Congress to confer jurisdiction over suits between citizens of
different States and between a citizen of a State and an alien,121 but it
does not authorize Congress to confer jurisdiction over a suit between
only aliens.122 If the permanent-resident alien is deemed only a citizen of
the State of his permanent residence, a lawsuit exists between two
persons who are aliens for all purposes except § 1332. While Congress
ultimately defines citizenship for immigration purposes, surely some
limits govern the extent to which Congress can sidestep Article III § 2’s
limits by “deeming” a person a citizen solely for the purpose of a
lawsuit.123 Could Congress deem an alien a citizen of any State in which
120
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005). See also Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)
(“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems,” [a] court [should] “construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”).
121
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
122
See cases cited supra note 23.
123
See Richard Bisio, Changes in Diversity Jurisdiction and Removal, 69 MICH. B.J.
1026, 1028 (1990); John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal
Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 735, 745 (1991) (“The possibly unconstitutional application of the 1988
Act arises when one alien sues another in federal court on a nonfederal claim.”); see also
Jackson v. Twentyman, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 136, 136 (1829) (“[T]he judicial power does not
extend to private suits in which an alien is a party, unless a citizen be the adverse party
. . . .”). But see Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 1993) (suggesting
the presence of “intriguing issues” regarding what has come to be known as “protective
jurisdiction.”). The potential application of protective jurisdiction is well beyond this
article’s scope. Here, it is enough to say that the Supreme Court has never endorsed the
doctrine, Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137-38 (1989), and that “[a] statute must be
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the alien files a lawsuit? There’s no need to resolve the constitutional
question—the statute is ambiguous and the mere existence of this
plausible constitutional challenge favors not reading an [only] into the
statute. The [also] construction eliminates the possibility of an
unconstitutional result because it does not remove alien status for
purposes of a lawsuit.
The Singh case is the leading case approving of jurisdiction in this
124
area. The Singh court erred in two fundamental ways. First, by using
adverbial and adjectival shortcuts, the court concluded that the text is
“clear” without parsing the text.125 According to the court, the statute
clearly deems the permanent-resident alien a citizen of his state of
domicile.126 But that’s not the dispute. Rather, the dispute is (or at least
should be) about whether the permanent-resident alien is deemed only a
citizen of that State.
The second and more troubling error appeared in the court’s evenif-the-statute-is-ambiguous alternative discussion, where the court
wrongly discarded the canon of constitutional doubt, endorsing a
chameleon approach since rejected by the Supreme Court in Clark v.
Martinez.127 The Singh party alignment was slightly different than the
hypothetical we have been evaluating (permanent-resident alien
domiciled in State X v. nonresident alien). In the Singh variation, the
permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X sued an alien and a citizen
of State Y. The court refused to apply the canon of constitutional doubt.
The court correctly noted that, because of the additional party’s presence,
finding jurisdiction in the case would not violate Article III because
minimal diversity was present.128 But the court erred by relying upon that
distinction to refuse to apply the canon. The statute must mean the same
thing regardless of whether an additional party happens to be present.
The canon of constitutional doubt “is a tool for choosing between
competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the
reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative,
which raises serious constitutional questions.”129 The reasonable
presumption is used to divine congressional intent, which has nothing to
do with which parties are before the court. As Justice Scalia recently
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is
unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.” United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,
241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916).
124
Singh, 9 F.3d 303.
125
Id. at 306-07.
126
Id. at 306.
127
543 U.S. 371 (2005).
128
Singh, 9 F.3d at 312.
129
Clark, 543 U.S. at 381.
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clarified, “when deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions
to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice.
If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the
other should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems
pertain to the particular litigant before the Court.”130 Under the Singh
approach, the statute may have meant something different had an
additional party not been present. Such an approach distorts the role of
statutory interpretation, “render[ing] every statute a chameleon, its
meaning subject to change depending upon the presence or absence of
constitutional concerns in each individual case.”131
In summary, jurisdiction fails when a permanent-resident alien sues
a nonresident alien. The “shall be deemed” language operates the same
here as it did when we evaluated whether a foreign corporation with a
principal place of business in State X could sue a nonresident alien. Both
the corporation and the permanent-resident alien are deemed citizens of
State X, but not deemed [only]. Rather, they both retain their preexisting
alien status. This construction avoids constitutional problems and is an
equally plausible reading of the statutory text.
Finally, one obscure area that borders alien-jurisdiction law
deserves mention, namely the area of dual nationals. Because of the
nuances of the law of international relations, an individual can be a
“citizen or subject” of multiple nations. Several courts have encountered
such situations, and “[t]here is an emerging consensus among courts that,
for a dual national citizen, only the American citizenship is relevant for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction[,]”132 though an exception may exist
when the foreign citizenship is “dominant.”133 Even assuming these cases
are correctly decided, they should not influence the construction of the
permanent-resident deeming provision, which presents a different
question. The dual-nationals cases involve the courts’ struggles with
reconciling the term “citizen or subject” of a foreign state with
immigration policy, which “abhors the status of dual citizenship,”134 and
the law of international relations. Conversely, in the deeming provision,
Congress expressly targeted foreign citizens and conferred State
citizenship upon them when they are permanent residents. No inference
need be drawn about substantive immigration policy because the
provision, by definition, does not apply to persons who are “abhorrent”
130
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dual citizens. Rather, it applies only when the case involves someone
who satisfies the congressional definition of permanent resident, which
of course expects to find a person who is a citizen or subject of a foreign
state.
Permanent-resident alien domiciled in State X v. permanentresident alien domiciled in State Y. No reported cases discuss this
scenario, and the following discussion is largely academic. But it raises
some troubling structural issues with § 1332 and its subcategories.
Under my approach, both litigants have dual citizenship, they are
both aliens and citizens of their respective states of domicile. Because
aliens are present on both sides, jurisdiction fails unless the case satisfies
§ 1332(a)(3). Section 1332(a)(3) grants jurisdiction when the suit is
between “citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of
a foreign state are additional parties.” The parties are citizens of different
states, but jurisdiction apparently fails because there are no aliens as
additional parties—the aliens are the same parties. So jurisdiction fails,
right?
To explore how (a)(3) interacts with dual-citizenship litigants,
consider a simple example. Suppose our plaintiff is a United States
Citizen domiciled in State X. Our defendant is a corporation incorporated
abroad and having a principal place of business in State Y. The
defendant is a dual citizen, both an alien and a State Y citizen.
Jurisdiction obviously exists, but under what subsection? Not under pure
diversity jurisdiction, because aliens are parties, and not under pure
alienage jurisdiction, because State citizens appear on both sides.
Jurisdiction can only exist under (a)(3). But the corporation is not an
“additional party.” It is tempting to argue that jurisdiction can be found
here by combining (a)(1) and (a)(2), but that would effectively read
(a)(3) out of the statute, and would create more conceptual difficulties. If
the answer is to treat dual-citizenship parties as two separate parties for
purposes of (a)(3), then (a)(3) would authorize jurisdiction in the
hypothetical suit between permanent-resident aliens. Indeed, if that
construction continues, jurisdiction would exist between two alien
corporations having principal places of business in different states. If the
answer is that the aliens must truly be “additional parties,” then from
where does jurisdiction arise in our corporate example?
These problems are ancillary, and largely academic, but they
illustrate that no solution is perfect. Importantly, the existence of these
problems does not support the alternate construction. The deemed [also]
solution eliminates the constitutional problems in the scenarios where it
has arisen and, practically, where it is likely to arise again. The following
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subpart evaluates my solution overall and responds to additional
criticisms.
C. A Cohesive Result
Having exhausted the details, I now summarize my construction of
the words “shall be deemed” and how my construction yields a cohesive,
desirable result.
The words “shall be deemed” perform a simple function in the
deeming provisions; i.e., they confer State citizenship on certain litigants.
If a corporation is incorporated in a State, it is a citizen of that State. If a
corporation has its principal place of business in a State, it is a citizen of
that State. If a permanent-resident alien is domiciled in a State, she is a
citizen of that State. But the words “shall be deemed” do not strip a party
of preexisting alien status. That is, the words “shall be deemed” do not
mean “shall be deemed [only].” If an alien was an alien before Congress
passed the deeming provision, the alien remains an alien and is deemed
[also] a citizen of her State of domicile.
Thus, neither of the deeming provisions create jurisdiction where it
did not exist before Congress passed them. The statutory structure,
historical context, and legislative history surrounding the provisions
support the idea that Congress enacted the deeming provisions to carve
out certain essentially local disputes from § 1332. Under my approach, as
illustrated by the chart, that is all the deeming provisions do. They leave
other scenarios unchanged, never creating jurisdiction where it did not
exist before.
My approach avoids the constitutional problems raised by the
alternative approach in the permanent-resident-alien context. If the
deeming provision strips a permanent-resident alien of her alien status,
serious constitutional questions arise about Congress’s Article III power
to confer jurisdiction. My approach avoids that question.
My approach facilitates consistency among the deeming provisions
in § 1332. By reading the two deeming provisions together, the same
words can be given the same meaning. And by reading the two
provisions to mean “shall be deemed [also],” significance is given to
other provisions of § 1332 that expressly state “shall be deemed only.”
My approach is textually faithful. The statute is ambiguous. But
that ambiguity is not a license to merely search for congressional intent
without reference to the text. When a statute is ambiguous, the courts
must choose between plausible interpretations. That means discerning
what the statue might reasonably mean, and then choosing one of those
meanings, not saying that the meaning is unclear and then concluding
that jurisdiction would be wisely exercised. One might conjure up certain
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scenarios, where in the view of the conjurer, exercising jurisdiction
would better serve the purposes of alienage jurisdiction. But the
desirability of results cannot distort the task—giving effect to the statute.
It is plausible to read the statute as deeming litigants [also] or [only]
citizens of certain states. But one approach must prevail, and for the
reasons I have presented, the [also] answer is the better one. A consistent
construction must be chosen; “to give these same words a different
meaning [in different circumstances] would be to invent a statute rather
than to interpret one.”135
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